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Issue Competition without Electoral Incentives? A Study
of Issue Emphasis in the European Parliament
Maurits J. Meijers, Radboud University
Harmen van der Veer, Leiden University
Niche party leverage over mainstream party policy agendas is a central theme in the issue competition literature. The
literature has underlined that the electoral threat associated with niche party issue mobilization guides mainstream
party responses to such niche parties. Yet how do political parties react to issue mobilization in an institutional setting
not primarily steered by electoral considerations? We argue that the European Parliament constitutes such a case and
study issue competition on the radical right’s core issue: immigration. To establish the leverage of radical right members
of the European Parliament (MEPs), we use an original data set of parliamentary questions and motions between 2004
and 2016. Using time-series regression analysis, we find that mainstream party groups do not increase their emphasis of
immigration issues in response to radical right MEPs’ issue emphasis. These findings indicate that the institutional
context and the perceived electoral threat are crucial for issue competition dynamics.
In recent years, evidence has mounted that mainstream po-litical parties respond to the threat of radical right partiesby increasingly emphasizing the radical right’s core issue:
immigration (Abou-Chadi 2016; Bale et al. 2010; Meguid
2005; van de Wardt 2015). The issue competition literature
underlines that niche parties, including the radical right, have
an interest in stressing issues that were previously ignored
by mainstream parties and that do not match the dominant
lines of political conflict (De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Meguid
2005). In turn, gauging the extent of the electoral threat of the
niche party in question, mainstream parties devise a response
strategy. When the niche party threat is considerable, main-
stream parties tend to increasingly emphasize the issue. Yet,
when the niche party threat is absent or weak, mainstream
parties are usually prone to adopt a dismissive strategy to keep
the issue off the agenda (Meguid 2008, 99–103). Hence, a key
argument of this literature is that parties do not have a mo-
nopoly over their own agenda but are forced to be responsive
to one another when devising their issue emphasis strategies.
Crucially, such electoral drivers of issue competition are not
limited to the electoral arena but are also found in the par-
liamentary arena (Green-Pedersen 2010; Otjes 2011; van de
Wardt 2015; Vliegenthart, Walgrave, and Meppelink 2011;
Vliegenthart, Walgrave, and Zicha 2013).
Yet, how do political parties react to niche party issue mo-
bilization in a parliamentary setting in which institutional
factors constrain niche party leverage? The European Parlia-
ment (EP) is such a parliament. In contrast to domestic par-
liaments, the EP’s parliamentary arena is disconnected from its
electoral arena(s) (Hix and Høyland 2013). In the electoral
arena, national parties compete with domestic competitors
over seats in the EP. In the parliamentary arena, however, Eu-
ropean party groups compete with each other in the EP over
policy (Hix 2002b). Furthermore, the extreme dominance of
mainstream party groups within the EP is likely to affect is-
sue competition dynamics (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). Un-
like in the domestic context, niche party behavior in the EP is
therefore less likely to have electoral consequences for the
mainstream party groups.
In line with issue competition theory, we argue that the
absence of a veritable electoral threat of radical right parties
in the EP motivates mainstream party groups to adopt a dis-
missive strategy by decreasing their emphasis of the immi-
gration issue. Given the growing presence of radical right
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parties in the EP (Treib 2014) and the increasing compe-
tences of the EP in justice and home affairs under the ordi-
nary legislative procedure since the Lisbon Treaty (Lavenex
2015), the immigration issue can be regarded as a crucial case
for issue competition in the EP.
Since legislative agenda setting is primarily steered by the
European Commission (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007, 116),
our focus lies on nonlegislative parliamentary instruments
that play a role in issue competition (e.g., Green-Pedersen
2010; Proksch and Slapin 2011). Using an original data set
measuring members of the European Parliament’s (MEPs)
issue emphasis through various types of parliamentary ques-
tions and motions spanning August 2004 to February 2016 on
a weekly basis, we examine the leverage of radical right MEPs
on European party groups (EPGs) dominated by national main-
stream parties.
We find that European mainstream party groups decrease
their weekly immigration emphasis in reaction to the radical
right and, hence, do not find evidence for a positive conta-
gion effect of radical right mobilization. This finding is ro-
bust to various estimation techniques and measurement meth-
ods. The results support the notion that both the electoral and
the institutional context are key for dynamics of parliamen-
tary issue competition—a conclusion that is important be-
yond the case of the EP. When institutional constraints min-
imize the electoral threat of niche parties, niche parties do not
have the leverage they enjoy in electorally sensitive parlia-
mentary contexts. In addition, the findings corroborate the
supposition that parliamentary politics in the EP is domi-
nated by the major party groups (Hix et al. 2007) leaving lit-
tle room for direct or indirect influence by the smaller party
groups.
THEORY
Saliency theory stipulates that a party’s policy program is
defined not solely by its position on a certain issue but also by
which political issues it chooses to address in the first place
(Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Budge and Farlie 1983; Car-
mines and Stimson 1986; Schattschneider 1960). Parties “own”
different issues and try to develop a distinctive profile by em-
phasizing those issues (Petrocik 1996). The radical right’s
ownership of the “immigration issue” (Abou-Chadi 2016), for
instance, is so outspoken that many scholars refer to these
parties exclusively as “anti-immigrant parties” (van der Brug,
Fennema, and Tillie 2005).
Parties do not operate in a political vacuum, however. They
respond to their political surroundings and engage in public
debate over a great number of issues (Damore 2004; Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Parties therefore do not have
absolute control over their own issue agendas. Particularly in
a competitive multiparty context, parties devise their issue
attention strategies with an eye on their opponents in order to
carve out a competitive advantage.
Moreover, not all types of political parties have equal
strategic interest in politicizing issues previously ignored on
the political agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Carmines
and Stimson 1986). Mainstream parties that regularly hold
office are not eager to radically transform the political agenda,
as they tend to benefit from the status quo. Niche parties, by
contrast, emphasize “noneconomic issues” largely ignored by
their competitors (Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012a) and tend to
benefit electorally from such “issue entrepreneurial strate-
gies” (De Vries and Hobolt 2012). While quite a number of
empirical studies focus on the extent to which mainstream
parties respond to niche parties with positional shifts (Bale
et al. 2010; Meijers 2017; van Spanje 2010), recent studies
have focused on mainstream party responses to niche party
agenda-setting efforts in terms of issue emphasis (Abou-
Chadi 2016; Meijers and Rauh 2016; Spoon, Hobolt, and de
Vries 2014; van de Wardt 2015).
Meguid (2005, 2008) has specified that mainstream parties
may react to niche parties with an accommodative, an ad-
versarial, or a dismissive strategy. Both the accommodative
strategy, in which the niche party’s position is adopted, and
the adversarial strategy, in which the niche party’s position
is contested, convey an increase of issue emphasis. By con-
trast, a dismissive strategy signals that an issue lacks signif-
icance. While we conceptualize a dismissive strategy as in-
dicating a decrease in issue emphasis (see Abou-Chadi 2016;
van de Wardt 2015), others regard it as signifying either no
increase in issue emphasis (Meguid 2005, 2008; see also Bale
et al. 2010) or less issue emphasis in comparison to other
parties or issues (Budge and Farlie 1983; Dolezal et al. 2014;
Wagner 2012b).
The choice to engage with a niche party’s issue is guided
by electoral considerations (Green-Pedersen 2007; Meguid
2008). Mainstream parties’ propensity to increase the em-
phasis of the niche party’s issue depends, first, on the specific
electoral threat the niche party poses (Meguid 2008, 99–103)
and, second, on the extent to which the mainstream party
considers the niche party issue to be a potential vote winner
(Spoon et al. 2014). In this vein, studies on domestic issue
competition over immigration policy have consistently found
a positive “contagion effect” of radical right immigration is-
sue emphasis on mainstream party emphasis (Abou-Chadi
2016; Harmel and Svasand 1997; van de Wardt 2015).
Crucially, this “electoral logic” of issue emphasis is not
limited to the electoral arena but also applies to the parlia-
mentary arena. Indeed, in most parliaments “legislative be-
havior is . . . shaped by the electoral contest” (Lindberg,
000 / Issue Competition without Electoral Incentives? Maurits J. Meijers and Harmen van der Veer
This content downloaded from 131.174.098.158 on August 23, 2019 04:48:09 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Rasmussen, and Warntjen 2008, 1110). Mainstream and gov-
erning parties have been shown to respond to issue mobili-
zation efforts of niche and opposition parties with increased
emphasis of the issue in question (Green-Pedersen and Mor-
tensen 2010; van de Wardt 2015; Vliegenthart et al. 2011).
With respect to the immigration issue, van de Wardt (2015)
has found that radical right niche parties affect the extent to
which mainstream opposition parties address immigration is-
sues in the Danish parliament.
Such issue engagement is usually costly in programmatic
terms, as mainstream parties are forced to adopt a position
on the issue, which is either a departure from their previous
stance or in direct opposition to the niche party’s position
(Bale et al. 2010; Meguid 2008). By contrast, a dismissive strat-
egy does not come at a great price. Therefore, only when the
niche party poses a serious electoral threat to the relevant
mainstream parties is it expected that mainstream parties
will not pursue a dismissive strategy (Meguid 2008, 100).
Importantly, the extent to which niche parties pose a threat
for mainstream parties is mediated by the electoral institu-
tions in place (Meguid 2008, 97–99; Rohrschneider 1993).
Mainstream party sensitivity to the niche party threat is me-
diated by the presence of electoral thresholds and dispro-
portion of the vote-seat index. Accordingly, the argument we
put forward in this article is in line with Meguid’s reasoning
that “strategic choices are sensitive to the setting in which they
are made” (2008, 97). The next section elaborates on why we
expect mainstream party groups in the EP to adopt a dismis-
sive strategy in response to radical right immigration issue
emphasis.
Issue competition in the EP
While studies of issue competition in the domestic context
consistently found positive contagion effects of radical right
mobilization on immigration policy, we expect issue com-
petition dynamics to unfold differently in the EP for two rea-
sons: politics in the EP is disconnected from its electoral
arena(s) (Hix et al. 2007, 26), and the European Union’s (EU)
institutional structure has produced a relative dominance of
the mainstream party families.
First, unlike the national parliamentary arena, the com-
position of the European parliamentary arena does not mirror
the electoral arena. In most domestic legislatures, the “par-
liamentary game” is a continuation of the “electoral game”
and vice versa (Green-Pedersen 2010; van de Wardt 2015;
Vliegenthart et al. 2011). Yet, elections to the EP are held at
the national level among domestic political parties—primar-
ily decided on the basis of domestic issues and European
integration issues (Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley 2009; Reif and
Schmitt 1980). Daily parliamentary affairs, however, are
structured by EPGs (Rasmussen 2008, 1179) in which ideo-
logically proximate national parties cooperate (McElroy and
Benoit 2010).
As such, MEPs have two different principals (Hix 2002b).
The national party selects candidates for EP elections. Party
groups, however, provide indispensable political resources
for MEPs between elections, such as their participation in
parliamentary committees, which draft legislative reports and
which receive speaking time in the plenary debates (Hix et al.
2007, 26). In fact, survey research among MEPs has found
that EPGs principally regulate MEPs in day-to-day politics
(Rasmussen 2008).
This produces the peculiar phenomenon of parliamentary
politics without direct electoral repercussions, which likely af-
fects patterns of parliamentary behavior. As Slapin and Proksch
(2010, 336) note, “the electoral disconnection between Eu-
ropean political groups and citizens raise[s] questions about
the extent to which the parliamentary behavior of MEPs mat-
ters for re-election.” As a result of the absence of such ex-
ternal motivations, “political behavior in the European Par-
liament is primarily driven by considerations internal to the
institution and the EU policy process” (Hix et al. 2007, 28).
A good example of this is that national competitors can be
part of the same EPG, as is the case with the Dutch center-
right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and
social-liberal D66 parties—both of which are members of the
liberal party group Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE).
With respect to issue competition, the lack of electoral
repercussions of EP politics suggests that EP issue competi-
tion is less likely to be driven by electoral incentives. Hence,
EP mainstream party groups have less to gain from increas-
ingly emphasizing issues in response to niche parties, since
the latter lack the electoral sway to present an imminent threat.
Rather, mainstream party groups have an interest in keep-
ing the issue agenda stable by defusing the niche party issue.
While the electoral opportunity structure in the domestic con-
text renders such a dismissive strategy rather risky (Bale et al.
2010; Meguid 2008, 99–103), party groups in the EP have
greater maneuvering space to do so.
Also, the institutional peculiarities of EU policy making
make a dismissive strategy of mainstream party groups in
response to niche party emphasis in the EP more plausible.
Legislative agenda setting in the European multilevel sys-
tem is strongly dominated by political actors affiliated with
Christian-democratic, social-democratic, and liberal parties
linked to the European People’s Party (EPP), Socialists and
Democrats (S&D), and ALDE, respectively (see Hix et al.
2007, 114). Even though there is no evidence for purposive
collusion across institutions and across party groups, there
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is a strong bias in the agenda-setting process toward centrist
policies close to the political median.
In contrast to most domestic parliaments, the EP does not
enjoy the right to initiate legislation. Instead, the commis-
sion proposes legislation, most of which must be passed by
both the council and the EP since the introduction of the “or-
dinary legislative procedure” in the Lisbon Treaty. Although
the commission is not steered by partisanship (Wonka 2008),
it cannot be discounted that nearly all commissioners are ca-
reer politicians stemming from the same Christian demo-
cratic and social democratic parties, and some are from liberal
parties (see Hix 2005, 70). Moreover, the council is charac-
terized by a rather centrist political profile, given that most
governing parties representing their member states are af-
filiated with the EPP, S&D, or ALDE.
In the EP, the EPP and S&D have consistently constituted
a majority and tend to dominate parliamentary affairs. In par-
ticular, the EP’s internal agenda-setting processes are strongly
dominated by the EPP and S&D and, to a lesser extent, ALDE.
Legislative agenda-setting offices, such as committee chairs
and rapporteurships in the EP, are allocated roughly in pro-
portion to party group size (Hix et al. 2007, 115). Moreover,
because EP decision making increasingly occurs through fast-
track early agreements conducted in secluded meetings with
representatives from the EP, the council, and the commission
(Yordanova 2016, 179), those actors affiliated with the larger
mainstream party groups have more influence in such early
agreement decision making (see Farrell and Héritier 2004).1
The EPP, S&D, and ALDE have an interest in upholding
the status quo, with respect to both their extraordinary dis-
cretion in agenda setting and the specific issues that feature
on the agenda. They have the incentive and the means to nip
radical right issue mobilization attempts in the bud with a
dismissive strategy on the immigration issue. Given the weak
electoral linkage, moreover, the EPP, S&D, and ALDE have
the ability to do so as MEPs’ parliamentary behavior seems of
little consequence to the voter.
The EP and immigration policy
The scope condition for successful radical right issue entre-
preneurship is that the EP is a relevant player in EU immi-
gration policy. Exercising control over entry to and residence
of migrants within the national territory touches on the es-
sence of national sovereignty (Lavenex 2015). Nevertheless,
the dissolution of national borders in the Schengen Area re-
quired close coordination among EU member states on key
questions such as immigration and asylum and border con-
trol. Over the years the EU has acquired significant compe-
tences over justice and home affairs (JHA)—often considered
to be “core state powers” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016).
Before the Maastricht Treaty, a number of significant co-
ordination efforts in directing European immigration and
asylum policies produced intergovernmental agencies and
treaties outside of the community framework (Lavenex 2015,
369–70). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty incorporated many
such intergovernmental treaties coordinating JHA policy into
EU treaty law in the EU’s intergovernmental “third pillar.”
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 integrated the Schengen
Convention into the treaties and formally placed migration
policy in the first pillar—making migration questions to a cer-
tain extent subject to the supranational community method
and empowering the EP through its role in the co-decision
procedure from 2004 onward.2 With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,
the EP was granted full co-decision powers, as the ordinary
legislative procedure was extended to all policy areas per-
taining to JHA issues (Lavenex 2015, 369–73).
Hence, the power of the EP in migration policy has in-
creased over the years (Hampshire 2015). As this arguably
increases the prominence of the immigration issue on the
EP’s agenda, the extension of the EP’s powers can affect issue
competition on the migration issue as it increases mainstream
party groups’ incentive to adopt a dismissive strategy in re-
action to radical right immigration emphasis.3
In line with the arguments related to mainstream domi-
nance in EU institutions presented above, Lahav and Messina
(2005), moreover, argue that there is an elite consensus on
the immigration issue among MEPs—not subject to left-right
contestation between the party groups. Given that political
conflict in the EP primarily revolves around the left-right
dimension and the EU integration dimension, mainstream
party groups should have no incentive to emphasize immi-
gration issues if external pressures are lacking (Hix 2001; Hix
et al. 2007, 149; Otjes and van der Veer 2016; Roger, Otjes,
and van der Veer 2017).
1. Also with respect to nonlegislative aspects of parliamentary activity
in the EP, the three mainstream party groups have privileged agenda-setting
opportunities. Many parliamentary instruments used for agenda setting,
such as the tabling of motions, requesting hearings with the commission,
and requesting parliamentary debates, are the exclusive prerogative of party
groups or ad hoc coalitions of at least 40 MEPs.
2. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom secured various opt-
outs for the communitarization of JHA issues.
3. Nevertheless, most key competences on migration policy remain
strongly in the hands of the member states’ governments. As Lavenex (2015,
375) points out, the uneven structure of JHA policy at the EU level is tes-
tament to cautiousness of national governments with respect to suprana-
tionalization of core state tasks and has resulted in an unfinished, unsettled
institutional framework (Luedtke 2009).
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Hypothesis
Combining insights from the issue competition literature
and the literature on the electoral and institutional structures
in the EP, we can formulate our central hypothesis. Both from
an electoral perspective and an institutional perspective,
EPGs likely adopt a dismissive strategy in response to radical
party group mobilization on immigration policy. The issue
competition literature has employed varying notions of the
dismissive strategy, however. Bale et al. (2010) and Meguid
(2005, 2008) conceptualize the dismissive strategy as non-
action, which presumably is analogous to a null hypothesis.
Others consider the dismissive strategy to denote a party’s
lesser degree of issue emphasis vis-à-vis its competitors—
hypothesizing differences across parties (Dolezal et al. 2014;
Wagner 2012b). This article regards a dismissive strategy to
signify a decrease in a party’s issue emphasis in comparison to
previous points in time (see also Abou-Chadi 2016; van de
Wardt 2015)—permitting a directional hypothesis test. Con-
sequently, considering the EP’s lack of electoral opportunity
structure and mainstream party groups’ interest in uphold-
ing their institutional dominance in the EU, our central hy-
pothesis states:
Dismissive Strategy Hypothesis The more radical
right MEPs emphasize the immigration issue at t 2 1,
the less mainstream party groups emphasize the im-
migration issue at time t.
DATA AND METHOD: ANALYZING ISSUE
COMPETITION IN THE EP
We study issue competition in the EP through MEPs’ issue
mobilization attempts with nonlegislative parliamentary in-
struments. By contrast, studies of EP agenda setting have of-
ten focused on the role of rapporteurs in shaping the formal
agenda (Finke 2012, 2015; Thierse 2019).4 Once the com-
mission has proposed a draft bill under the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, the Conference of Presidents (CoP) appoints
the relevant standing committee, which in turn assigns the
bill a rapporteur. The rapporteur evaluates the bill and adopts
a position on it and proposes amendments if deemed neces-
sary. Before the draft bill (with or without amendments) is
put to a plenary vote in the EP, the committee votes on and
amends the report. While the rapporteur has some leeway in
framing the bill’s policy issue (Thierse 2019), the rapporteur
ultimately is responsible for adopting a position on the bill
proposed by the commission (Hix et al. 2007, 113). Hence,
while rapporteurs are undoubtedly crucial players in the EU’s
policy process, they have very limited scope to introduce new
issues on the agenda.5 In other words, rapporteurships and
committee memberships are not viable venues for MEPs’ stra-
tegic issue emphasis.
In addition, the EP’s plenary agenda is determined by
the CoP, consisting of the EP president and the chairs of all
party groups, which usually operates on the basis of consen-
sus (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton 2011). Apart from or-
ganizing the day-to-day order of affairs, CoP members also
draft the agenda for the part sessions in which they can choose
to address certain issues. Yet, the plenary agenda is also not
relevant to studying issue competition, as the party groups
cannot choose single-handedly which issues will appear on
the agenda—the agenda is a compromise between multiple
actors. Moreover, it is not possible to ascertain which actor
in the CoP drives which agenda choice, given that the CoP
meets behind closed doors.6
In order to assess the dynamics of issue competition in
the EP, we therefore examine MEPs’ attempts to raise atten-
tion to the immigration issue with nonlegislative parliamen-
tary instruments (Proksch and Slapin 2011). We primarily
focus on written and written priority parliamentary ques-
tions. Parliamentary questions are particularly useful for is-
sue mobilization purposes, as it is the parliamentary tool least
affected by the disproportionate institutional constraints in
the EP.7 Parliamentary questions do not only offer a power-
ful instrument to political groups in opposition for executive
oversight (Proksch and Slapin 2011), but they are also im-
portant for issue competition for both mainstream and non-
mainstream actors (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010;
Vliegenthart et al. 2011).8
4. Scholarship on agenda setting in the EP context has focused on dif-
ferent emanations of agenda setting. Hix has regarded the extension of the EP
powers in the Amsterdam Treaty as the result of the EP’s “constitutional
agenda-setting” powers (Hix 2002a). Tsebelis (1994) regarded the EP’s ability
to incentivize the council to accept amendment proposals as an indication
of its agenda-setting powers. Others study voting patterns in the EP on an
agenda that is exogenously set by the commission and council (Blumenau and
Lauderdale 2018; see Otjes and van der Veer [2016] for similar findings).
5. So-called own initiative reports are an exception, as committees are
free to select the subject. Nevertheless, own initiative reports formally also
require the consent of the CoP.
6. A semiautomated content analysis on the keyword “migration,”
moreover, shows that throughout EP 6 (2004–9) and EP 7 (2009–14) mi-
gration appeared on the agenda only 22 times out of ca. 400 plenary days. This
suggests that, if anything, the CoP adopts a dismissive strategy on the im-
migration issue.
7. Other nonlegislative parliamentary instruments, such as speeches
and the tabling of motions, face greater institutional constraints. Given
that most speeches are to be held on an issue previously determined by the
CoP makes it a less effective tool for issue competition.
8. MEPs can pose four types of parliamentary questions: ordinary par-
liamentary questions, priority written questions, questions for question time
prior to a legislative debate, and questions with an oral answer and debate. Our
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Data
Our empirical focus lies on the emphasis of the immigra-
tion issue by MEPs through parliamentary questions during
the period between August 2004 and February 2016, span-
ning two full EP terms (the sixth term from 2004 to 2009 and
the seventh term from 2009 to 2014) and the first one and a
half years of the eighth term. The primary analysis relies on an
original data set of virtually all parliamentary records com-
bined with data on the party group and national party affili-
ation of the MEP in question.
This data set is constructed by automated scraping and
normalization of disaggregated data from the online parlia-
mentary archives. After structuring the parliamentary records,
we linked them to stable identifiers for legislators, parties,
and EPGs. The full data set of written and priority written
parliamentary questions amounts to 122,041 questions, 11,347
of which were related to the immigration issue. Radical
right MEPs asked 2,792 immigration-related questions, and
MEPs from the mainstream party groups asked a total of
4,393 questions.
Questions asked by MEPs whose national party is affili-
ated with the EPP, S&D, or ALDE are coded as “mainstream
party group questions” since their constituent national par-
ties often take part in national office (Hix et al. 2007, 116).
Table A1 (tables A1–A10 are available online) shows that
the absolute number as well as proportion of national parties
in government within the EPP, S&D, and ALDE is much
higher.
Whereas mainstream parties are aligned in party groups,
not all radical right parties have been able to form stable
party groups (McDonnell and Werner 2018). Although a num-
ber of radical right party groups exist or have existed, many
radical right MEPs are aligned with an informal technical
group of nonattached members. This nonattached group,
however, also contains Far Left oriented MEPs. Therefore,
“radical right questions” are coded on the basis of whether
the MEP’s national party belongs to the radical right party
family. Radical right parties are defined in accordance with
Mudde (2007).9 To examine whether mainstream party groups
respond differently to radical right emphasis than other party
groups, we have additionally collected data for the party groups
without radical right members; the radical left party group
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) and the
Green party group. Figure 1 shows the number of MEPs per
party group and the share of radical right MEPs. On average,
8% of MEPs are radical right MEPs, and 7% of the national
parties in the EP belong to the radical right.
Whether a parliamentary question concerns immigration
policy is established by means of a semiautomated content
analysis on the basis of a dictionary of keywords pertaining
to the immigration issue on the EU level. This list of key-
words is designed to appropriately cover both radical right
and mainstream party discourse on immigration on the EU
level.10 The descriptive analysis of keyword usage in table A3b
shows that most party groups use similar keywords referring
to immigration. Yet, the radical right uses keywords related
to “Islam” more and keywords related to “refugees” less than
other party groups.
Estimation method
In order to examine whether radical right immigration em-
phasis affects mainstream party groups’ emphasis of the is-
sue, we examine issue competition dynamics within various
time structures. Usually, issue competition dynamics are mea-
sured with extended time brackets of multiple years (De Vries
and Hobolt 2012), election years (Abou-Chadi 2016; Meguid
2008; Spoon et al. 2014), or calendar years (Green-Pedersen
2007; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; van de Wardt
2015). Yet, Vliegenthart et al. (2011) have argued that such an
approach does not do justice to fast-changing complexities
of issue competition in the parliamentary arena. Rather, in
an attempt to shape the agenda, parties are shown to also en-
gage in short-term issue competition (e.g., Meijers and Rauh
2016).
Following the study by Vliegenthart et al. (2011) of the
Belgian parliament, we therefore primarily focus on the weekly
issue competition dynamics in the EP in a time-series cross-
sectional design. Given that mainstream actors’ response to
niche parties can also occur in more extended time brackets,
we model the monthly and quarterly effects of radical empha-
sis on mainstream parties’ agendas as a robustness test. This
is important, as the time period in which parties and party
groups are expected to react to one another is undertheorized.
Hence, the main unit of analysis is the change in the number
of parliamentary questions on immigration posed per main-
stream party group per week—with the mainstream party
group as cross-section identifier. In other words, the depen-
dent variable is the first difference of mainstream party group
9. The appendix, available online, provides for a full list of national
parties considered to be radical right.
10. Keywords for mainstream party EU migration discourse were
informed by Lavenex’s (2015) chapter on JHA. Keywords for radical right
immigration discourse were created with reference to existing political
communication studies on immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart
2007). The full list of keywords is presented in table A3a.
principal analysis is restricted to ordinary parliamentary questions and priority
written questions, since other types of parliamentary questions face greater
institutional constraints, as the opportunity to successfully table them hinges
on acceptance of these questions by the EP president and the CoP.
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emphasis representing the change in emphasis of immigra-
tion compared to the week before. The main independent
variable is also first-differenced and measures the weekly
change of radical right immigration emphasis lagged by one
time period.11 With this first-differenced measurement, we
capture the dynamic effects of radical right issue emphasis
from week to week on mainstream parties’ emphasis of im-
migration policy.12 Table A4a shows the summary statistics
of the main variables for the weekly party group models.13
In order to examine whether radical right emphasis of
the immigration issue spurs a response of mainstream party
groups, we calculate pooled ordinary least squares regression
models with a Prais-Winsten transformation with a panel-
specific first-order autoregression, AR(1), error structure to
account for serial correlation. Other studies have relied on a
lagged dependent variable to account for autocorrelation, but
recent research has shown that this could lead to bias related
to trends in the error term (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow
2005). We include party group fixed effects by inserting party
group dummies in the model, as this is essential for making
causal claims about radical right issue emphasis on the main-
stream party group issue agenda (Abou-Chadi 2016). The
party group dummies also control for the direct and condi-
tional effect of party group membership and examine whether
some party groups are more responsive to the radical right
than others.
To account for the possibility that mainstream party
groups react to one another, we include the lagged first dif-
ferenced attention to immigration issues by the other main-
stream parties. In addition, we control for the direct and con-
ditional effect of EP terms for two reasons. First, with the
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, almost all
JHA issues related to immigration became subject to the or-
dinary legislative procedure—significantly empowering the
EP (Hampshire 2015). This can affect the incentives for main-
stream party group issue emphasis. Second, given that the
radical right increased its seat share considerably in the 2014
EP elections (Treib 2014), the dynamics of issue competi-
tion in the EP can be affected by the EP’s composition. This
amounts to the following basic model in which the sixth EP
term dummy and the ALDE party group dummy serve as
baseline variables:
Dmainstream EPG emphasisi;t
p b0 1 b1(Dradical right emphasisi;t21)
1 b2(Dother mainstream EPG emphasisi;t21)
1 b3(EP term 7 dummyi;t)1 b4(EP term 8 dummyi;t)
1 b5(EPP dummyi;t)1 b6(S&D dummyi;t)1 ui;t 1 εi;t:
Although we primarily focus on written parliamentary ques-
tions, it is nevertheless possible that mainstream party groups
Figure 1. Number of MEPs per party group (measured at the start of each legislative term) and the share of radical right MEPs in each party group
11. While we think a lag of one week reflects the dynamics of par-
liamentary behavior best, we do not exclude the possibility that further
lags could affect mainstream EPG’s immigration emphasis. Therefore,
table A5 shows the estimates for further and multiple lags.
12. The weekly time structure of the data ensures that the models
account for long- and medium-term contextual changes.
13. Summary statistics for other operationalizations can be found in
tables A4b–A4d.
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engage in issue competition using other nonlegislative par-
liamentary instruments, as they do not face the same institu-
tional constraints radical right MEPs face. To account for this
in the empirical design, we include an alternative dependent
variable as a robustness test with all relevant nonlegislative
parliamentary instruments, by adding oral parliamentary ques-
tions, preannouncement of questions at question time, and
motions for resolutions.
Following other studies of parliamentary issue competi-
tion (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; van de Wardt 2015;
Vliegenthart et al. 2011), we expect mainstream party groups
to engage in issue emphasis strategies as cohesive actors. Yet,
given that party switching between different EPGs occurs
(McElroy and Benoit 2010), it is possible that MEPs are not
guided by their party groups or national parties but engage in
issue emphasis strategies at their own discretion. Therefore,
we also calculate a model on the level of the individual MEPs
as a robustness test. We constructed our MEP-level data set by
generating observations on a week-by-week basis for all non–
radical right MEPs who have asked a parliamentary question
in the analyzed week mentioning immigration. The depen-
dent variable is a dichotomous variable measuring whether
an MEP emphasized the immigration issue or not. The inde-
pendent variable measures the total number of immigration-
related parliamentary questions asked by the radical right in
the previous week. To account for individual MEP character-
istics, we calculate a fixed effects logistic panel regression model
with an additional EP term and party group fixed effects.
RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the proportion of written and written pri-
ority parliamentary questions by party group related to the
immigration issue, relative to the total number of questions
asked for the sixth, seventh, and eighth EP (until February
2016). Figure 2 shows that the radical right is indeed the
“owner” of the immigration issue in the EP. Mainstream party
groups as well as the Green party group and the radical left
party group GUE/NGL emphasize the issue less in compari-
son to other issues. While the relative salience of the immi-
gration issue in the EP was stable before 2014, all party groups
have increased their share of immigration emphasis in the
eighth EP. Given the unprecedented increase in the number
of refugees in EU member states because of violent conflict in
nearby regions (Trauner 2016), this increase is not surprising.
It is important to note, however, that the radical right’s im-
migration emphasis remained approximately twice as strong
as the other party groups throughout the period. Moreover,
our central hypothesis formulated the expectation that main-
stream parties adopt a dismissive strategy on the immigration
issue in response to the radical right. As such, we expect that
this increase in immigration emphasis post-2014 is not caused
by the radical right’s issue emphasis.
The time-series cross-sectional analysis presented in ta-
ble 1 tests the central hypothesis that radical right MEPs
motivate mainstream party groups to emphasize the immi-
gration issue less. Table 1 demonstrates that radical right
emphasis change has a statistically significant negative effect
on the weekly change in emphasis of immigration issues by
mainstream parliamentary groups. This effect is small in sub-
stantive terms, however. The finding that the increase of im-
migration issue emphasis by radical right MEPs motivates
mainstream party groups to lower their attention to the im-
migration issue allows us to accept our central hypothesis—
notwithstanding the substantively small effect size. Contrary
to what is usually found in the domestic context, this therefore
confirms the expectation that increased radical right immi-
gration emphasis in the EP does not lead to a positive change
in mainstream party emphasis of the immigration issue.
Based on a model measuring the interaction between the
party group dummy and change of radical right immigration
emphasis, the marginal effects plot in figure 3 presents the
predicted value of the dependent variable for different values
of radical right emphasis change per party group—as is com-
mon practice when estimating conditional effects (Brambor,
Clark, and Golder 2006).14 In order to compare mainstream
party groups with nonmainstream parties, the estimates for
the Green party group and the radical left party group GUE/
NGL are also shown. Figure 3 shows that there is a significant
negative effect of radical right emphasis on the issue empha-Figure 2. Relative share of immigration-related written and priority written
parliamentary questions by party group relative to the total amount of
parliamentary questions for the sixth, seventh, and eighth EP. N p 96; 084
(total number of written and priority written parliamentary questions by
the selected party groups and MEP types).
14. The model with the interactions on which figs. 3 and 4 are cal-
culated can be found in table A5.
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sis of the mainstream party groups ALDE, EPP, and S&D but
not on the immigration emphasis of the green and radical left
party group. Moreover, the slope of the marginal effects plot
for the EPP and S&D is slightly steeper than for ALDE, sug-
gesting a more pronounced negative effect.
ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS
Crucially, our findings are robust to various model specifica-
tions, different time structures, and alternative measurement
methods. Table A6 shows that this finding also holds when
multiple lags are introduced. Moreover, vector autoregres-
sion analysis accompanied by cumulative impulse response
function graphs display a similar result (see tables A7a and
A7b and fig. A2; figs. A1–A4 are available online). In addi-
tion, in order to make sure that the significant negative effect
of radical right emphasis is particular to the immigration is-
sue and not the function of an agenda cycle, we conducted
placebo tests with another issue, the environment. The results
in table A8b indicate that the radical right emphasis of the
environmental issue has no statistically significant impact on
mainstream environment emphasis, which further augments
the confidence in our results.
It is conceivable that time- and EP-term-dependent factors
influence our results. Therefore, we have additionally exam-
ined the conditional effect of the EP term on the effect of rad-
ical right immigration emphasis on mainstream party em-
phasis as shown in figure 4. We find that the negative effect
of radical right immigration emphasis on mainstream party
group emphasis change is more pronounced in the seventh
EP term than in the sixth EP term.15 The negative effect in the
eighth EP term—compared to the seventh EP term—was even
more pronounced. As the greater effect size also indicates,
these findings suggest that as the salience of the immigration
issue increases over time, as figure 1 has shown, the size of the
negative effect of radical right emphasis increases.16 The
finding that mainstream parties respond stronger to radical
right MEPs’ immigration emphasis in times when in the im-
migration issue becomes more salient provides additional
evidence for the hypothesis that mainstream party groups
attempt to de-emphasize the immigration issue in response
to the radical right when they have the ability to do so.
As it is theoretically possible that mainstream party groups
choose to respond to the radical right using other parliamen-
tary instruments, we calculated weekly models that allowed
for the possibility that both radical right and mainstream
MEPs use additional instruments including oral parliamen-
tary questions, preannouncements of questions at question
time, and motions (model 1 in table 2). Nevertheless, this
analysis yields substantively similar results. The fact that the
inclusion of motions and other types of parliamentary ques-
tions does not affect the results lends further credence to their
robustness and suggests that—as expected—these other non-
legislative parliamentary instruments are not relevant for
parliamentary issue competition in the EP.
Additionally, we have conducted a robustness test for the
possibility that radical right MEPs induce more immigra-
tion emphasis within larger time brackets. In table 2, we re-
port analyses based on monthly and quarterly data in models
2 and 3, respectively. In the monthly and quarterly analyses,
we no longer find a significant negative effect of radical right
immigration emphasis. Yet, the statistically insignificant esti-
mates suggest that there is no positive effect of radical right
emphasis on mainstream immigration emphasis.17 Given that
Table 1. Pooled Time Series Regression Model of Mainstream




D radical right emphasis (t 2 1) 2.0833***
(.0196)
D other mainstream EPG emphasis (t 2 1) 2.0262
(.0178)
European People’s Party .0193
(.112)
Socialists and Democrats .0250
(.0873)
European Parliament 7 .0844
(.303)







Note. Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard
errors in parentheses. EPG p European party group.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
15. The difference between the sixth and the seventh EP is borderline
significant at an alpha of 0.05.
16. Additionally, we have calculated the marginal effects of radical right
emphasis change for a linear (fig. A3a) and a quadratic (fig. A3b) continuous
time variable. Substantively, these estimates show the same result. Yet, they
indicate that there is no significant negative effect of radical right emphasis
change on mainstream party groups before the seventh EP term.
17. The marginal effects plots per party group for the aggregated
monthly and quarterly analyses in the appendix corroborate this.
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a dismissive strategy has been conceptualized not only as a
decrease in emphasis but also as a lack of response in emphasis
(see Meguid 2005), the results of the monthly and quarterly
analyses suggest a dismissive response à la Meguid. However,
since the absence of statistically significant effects offers weak
evidence for the actual absence of a relationship (Gill 1999;
Rainey 2014), additional evidence specifying the absence of
meaningful effects strengthens arguments for the absence of
an effect (Rainey 2014). The coefficient plots in figures A5a
and A5b indicate that the insignificant effect is also a sub-
stantively negligible effect.18 The absence of a substantively
meaningful positive effect increases our confidence that main-
stream party groups do not increase their emphasis in reac-
tion to the radical right in the monthly and quarterly time
periods.
The previous models on party group level data are based
on the implicit assumption that EPGs largely function as co-
hesive actors. The occurrence of party switching between
different EPGs suggests, however, that MEPs are possibly not
steered by their respective party groups (McElroy and Benoit
2010). As a robustness check, we therefore examine whether
the result also holds with MEP-level data with a fixed effects
logistic panel regression model (table A10). The statistically
significant, negative coefficient displays a similar effect for
the MEP-level data. This bolsters our confidence in the party
group level results and serves as additional evidence that
party groups are cohesive agenda setters in the EP (Rasmus-
sen 2008). To be sure, such party group cohesion does not
prove that unity is a function of party groups’ ability to en-
force MEP loyalty rather than a product of converging MEP
preferences (see Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017).
For the purpose of our theoretical argument, however, the
strong convergence of the party group level and the MEP-level
results is sufficient evidence that our party group level analy-
Figure 3. Marginal effect of a change in radical right immigration issue emphasis at t 2 1 on the predicted change of mainstream party group emphasis of the
immigration issue per party group. Rug plot presents the distribution of the variable D radical right emphasis (t 2 1).
18. The definition and measurement of meaningful effects is discussed
in the appendix.
Figure 4. Marginal effect of a change in radical right immigration issue
emphasis at t 2 1 on the predicted change of mainstream party group
emphasis between EP 6 and EP 7 (left) and EP 7 and EP 8 (right).
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sis is not the product of “artificial” aggregation. All in all, our
central hypothesis, which formulated the expectation that
radical right issue emphasis change on the immigration issue
negatively affects the propensity of mainstream party groups
to address the issue, can be accepted.
CONCLUSION
The issue competition literature argues that the leverage of
niche parties, such as the radical right, over mainstream pol-
icy agendas hinges on the potential electoral threat the niche
party poses to the mainstream party (Green-Pedersen 2007;
Meguid 2008). Relying on an original data set of immigration-
related parliamentary questions posed by MEPs between 2004
and 2016, we examined the case of immigration issue em-
phasis in the EP—an institutional setting in which niche party
actors lack electoral leverage over mainstream actors and
face particular institutional disadvantages vis-à-vis their main-
stream competitors. We show that the lack of a strong electoral
connection in the EP and the disproportionate institutional
power in the EP creates a condition in which mainstream
party groups do not respond to increased radical right im-
migration emphasis with increased immigration emphasis.
Rather, dynamic week-by-week analyses demonstrated that
our hypothesis that mainstream party groups tone down
the emphasis of the immigration issue in response to radical
right emphasis can be accepted. This corroborates other find-
ings of short-term party issue competition (Hopmann et al.
2012; Meijers and Rauh 2016; Vliegenthart et al. 2011). The
monthly and quarterly analyses moreover found no mean-
ingful positive effect of radical right mobilization in the EP
indicating that mainstream party groups do not increase their
emphasis of the immigration issue in response to the radical
right.
This pattern deviates considerably with the patterns found
in the national electoral arena. National-level studies have
shown that mainstream parties increase the emphasis of the
immigration issue in response to the mobilization of the
immigration issue by radical right parties (Abou-Chadi 2016;
Harmel and Svasand 1997; van de Wardt 2015). Our find-
ings therefore suggest that institutional opportunity struc-
tures shaping the niche party actors’ threat potential are cru-
cial for our understanding of issue emphasis of mainstream
parties in response to radical right challengers. This conclu-
sion is in line with the idea that electoral rules and parlia-
mentary rules have a strong influence on the dynamic inter-
action between niche party actors and mainstream party actors
Table 2. Alternative Specifications of the Pooled Time Series Regression Model of Mainstream EPG’s Change
in Immigration Emphasis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






D radical right emphasis (t 2 1) 2.0789** .0189 2.0843
(.0286) (.0528) (.0817)
D other mainstream EPG emphasis (t 2 1) 2.0356 .0164 2.0419
(.0235) (.0485) (.0766)
European People’s Party .0182 .0821 .126
(.128) (.162) (.173)
Socialists and Democrats .0229 .114 .134
(.100) (.134) (.139)
European Parliament 7 .160 .196 .922
(.510) (.502) (.556)
European Parliament 8 .524 1.141 2.369**
(.820) (.814) (.907)
Time 2.000635 2.00291 2.0392
(.00171) (.00737) (.0247)
Constant .0706 .0215 .347
(.286) (.284) (.346)
N 1,803 414 138
Note. Prais-Winsten regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. EPG p European party group.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
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(Karp and Banducci 2002; Meguid 2008, 97–99; Rohrschnei-
der 1993). Future research should further explore how elec-
toral institutions and parliamentary procedural rules affect
issue competition dynamics—also in the domestic context.
The contrasting findings in the weekly analysis and the
monthly and quarterly analyses moreover highlight concep-
tual ambiguity with respect to dismissive and de-emphasizing
strategies. So far, the literature has not been clear about the
different manifestations of dismissive strategies. To some, a
dismissive strategy refers to nonaction (Bale et al. 2010; Car-
mines and Stimson 1986; Meguid 2008); others regard a dis-
missive strategy to denote a low degree of issue emphasis rel-
ative to other competitors (Dolezal et al. 2014; Wagner 2012b),
to other issues (Budge and Farlie 1983; Volkens et al. 2013), or
to previous points in time (Abou-Chadi 2016; van de Wardt
2015). Scholars of issue competition are therefore well ad-
vised to clarify conceptually what they measure and, accord-
ingly, reflect on that in theoretical terms.
This article has focused on issue competition through non-
legislative parliamentary instruments in the EP. Our results
are robust to the inclusion of various parliamentary instru-
ments. Parliamentary activities by parliamentary committees
and rapporteurs are not included in the analysis, as we argue
that these venues do not give MEPs the opportunity to stra-
tegically emphasize certain policy issues. Our empirical focus
on a single political arena is moreover in line with virtually all
studies of issue competition focusing either on the electoral
setting (Abou-Chadi 2016; Budge and Farlie 1983; De Vries
and Hobolt 2012; Meguid 2005) or on the parliamentary set-
ting (Green-Pedersen 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen
2010; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Vliegenthart et al. 2011). In-
tegrating different political arenas with distinct institutional
dynamics in a single explanatory model of party competition
nevertheless remains a task for the discipline—both in the na-
tional and in the EU context.
In all likelihood the issue of immigration will stay and be-
come even more important with the rising number of immi-
grants coming to the EU (Trauner 2016). At the same time, the
progression toward an “ever-closer Union” has come under
attack, not only by Eurosceptic parties on the fringes of the
political spectrum but also from mainstream parties (Meijers
2017). In the United Kingdom, the immigration issue was a
key factor in the Brexit referendum to leave the EU in June
2016 (Hobolt 2016). Moreover, in many respects the formal
competences on migration policy still reside with the member
states and the introduction of the Early Warning Mechanism
since the Lisbon Treaty has increasingly empowered national
parliaments to steer EU legislation (Cooper 2012). The na-
tionalization of immigration policy could lead to a further de-
coupling of the EP’s electoral and parliamentary arena, giving
mainstream EPGs even more leeway to de-emphasize immi-
gration policy in the EP. Our results suggest that this might be
the case. The increase in immigration salience in the EP since
the eighth EP term, on the one hand, and the stronger de-
emphasizing response of mainstream party groups to the rad-
ical right in the eighth EP term, on the other hand, imply that
mainstream party groups can afford to be unresponsive to po-
litical competitors when shielded from electoral competition.
Yet, the surge in the number of refugees has forced the EU
to act cohesively—as the contentious EU-Turkey agreement
of March 2016 demonstrates. Supranational solutions to the
migration issue can increase the importance of immigration
policy in the EP—as the increasing salience of the immigra-
tion issue in the EP since mid-2014 suggests. Therefore, the
political reality of the increase of migrants from war-stricken
regions seems to do what the radical right has been unable to
do: to change the political agenda mainstream party groups
have tried to carefully control.
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